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MANAGERS AND OWNERS ON THE CAPITAL MARKET

Crisis in company management

INTRODUCTION  

I. CRISIS OF THE DOMINANT MODEL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
1.1. Neo-liberal Economic Concept 
1.2. Microeconomic nature of globalisation  
1.3. Financing companies via the stock exchange and banking system  
1.4. The growing importance of international capital flows as a consequence of technological progress and liberalization 
1.5. The increasing role of stock exchanges  
1.6. Taking huge risks – management at the edge  
1.6.1. The risk of excessive reliance of countries and companies on foreign capital 
1.6.2. Financial crises as a consequence of excessive leverage and risk  

II. THE GROWING ROLE OF MANAGERS AND REDUCED INFLUENCE OF THE OWNERS ON MANAGEMENT OF COMPANIES  
2.1. Ownership as a pillar of the economic system  
2.2. New determinants of property rights theory and agency dilemma 
2.3. Causes of agency conflicts and agency costs  
2.4. The increase in agency costs due to capital market development 
2.4.1. Rise of anonymity of owners and hostile takeovers as a result of the huge increase in the scale of shares trade  
2.4.2. The growing role of institutional investors and their impact on the management  
2.5. Capital market development, privatisation and nationalization of enterprises  
2.6. The impact of dispersion of ownership on owners’ control  

III. THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND INCREASINGLY SOPHISTICATED FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS ON RISK AND LEVERAGE  
3.1. The dynamic development of institutional investors and financial instruments 
3.2. The special role of investment banking  
3.3. Shortening the investment perspective as a result of development of the capital markets and institutional investors  
3.4. Alienation or domination of capital markets in a globalised environment  
3.5. The inevitability of financial crises – crises always erupt, and are always surprising 
3.6. Possibilities to protect capital from investors’ short -sightedness  

IV. VARIATIONS OF CORPORATE CONTROL – ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF SEPARATION OF MANAGEMENT AND PROPERTY  
4.1. Increasing enterprise value as a main objective of activity 
4.1.1. The problem with the valuation of enterprises  
4.1.2. Motivating managers to achieve increase in value – rewarding short -term ‘success’ 
4.2. Shareholders’ rights and equal treatment of shareholders  
4.3. The role of various interest groups in corporate governance – the problem of corporate social responsibility  
4.4. The impact of information on investors’ decisions 
4.5. The concept of market information efficiency  
4.6. Capital market imperfections 
4.7. Methods of solving the agency dilemma used to-date – the effectiveness of mechanisms of controlling (monitoring) managers  
4.8. Communication of companies with their surroundings – the manipulation of information and information asymmetry  
4.8.1. The role of investment advisers 
4.8.2. The role of credit rating in the process of raising capital 
4.8.3. Improper use of information – aggressive accounting and use of confidential information  
4.8.4. Dissemination of international accounting standards  

V. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF STATE AS CONTROLLER AND OWNER  
5.1. The state as owner of companies 
5.2. The impact of capital market on changing the state’s role – restrictions in conducting of monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies 
5.3. Institutional determinants of capital market efficiency – actions of the state to limit agency costs  
5.4. Incompleteness of globalisation – the need to create a supranational supervision  

CONCLUSIONS  

BIBLIOGRAPHY  

271 pages